we ware on 3 day training led by a guy who spent 1 year on Ukrainian front lines operating reconnaissance and kamikaze drones. brain dump of some of the tidbits i’ve learned:
- it’s staggering how much off-the-shelf non-military grade hardware is used; with a bit of duct tape, 3d printing and improvised explosives:
- reconnaissance drones are prosumer-level DJI Mavic 3, Autel Evo II Pro,
- android-based tablets for streaming video from drones, running battlefield mapping software,
- DJIs have custom firmware removing all sort of limits,
- GPS is jammed, drones drift and require constant manual adjustment of their position,
- Mavics are used to drop explosives; dropper modules are 3d printed with a bit of electronics – bottom light on the drone is used to trigger the drop via photo-diode installed on the dropper,
- FPV drones are often used in kamikaze missions and are always monitored by reconnaissance drone,
- communication is done over the internet, sometimes via signal or discord, sometimes via specialized software; starlink works reliably as an uplink; drone footage is re-broadcasted and made available not to commanders and soldiers in peer groups,
- quadcopters are heavily used by both sides and have revolutionized front lines – any vehicles arriving few kilometers near the front line will be destroyed by drones;
- there’s heavy frequency jamming, in response – more and more drones are controlled via fiber cable which can go up to 20km; battlefield is covered in fiber strings left by dozens of drones tens of drones flying each day over each kilometer of the front line,
- explosives are often hand made or hand-modified from grenades, land-mines, mortar shells,
- stray dogs and cats are indicator of soldiers hiding in bunkers, so are growing piles of trash. over time drone operators patrolling given part of the front line learn about every detail and spot any change that can indicate hiding place of enemy unit,
- while there’s a lot of innovation it’s really surprising that:
- there’s no separation of controller unit and radio transmitting unit – instead controllers are connected via long cables carrying radio signals to external antennas and signal boosters,
- there are no batteries that can be charged in parallel to speed up re-charging,
- energy management is very important – large power banks are swapped each day at the frontline positions, re-charging batteries must be done immediately after landing, to be able to have ‘eyes’ in the sky all the time; batteries charge slower than they discharge – for each day ~40 batteries are needed to be able to fly constantly,
- corruption in Ukraine is visible – e.g. bribes for avoiding military service, getting ability to leave country or when handling public procurement process.
interviews with the trainer:
what we’ve heard about the reality of drone war is very close to what you can learn e.g. from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFYYUi8wyjI
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brain dump from 3 day training my wife and I have been on a week ago. It was lead by Polish guy who just came back from 10 months service on the Ukrainian front line as a drone operator. I thought you might find it interesting.
- Front line:
- Drones changed economy of the warfare – expensive tanks & armored vehicles are single serving; ~5 drone strikes are enough to take them out,
- Battlefield is monitored by drones 24×7 ; there’s at least one drone team per each kilometer of the front line. Team usually has 3 persons – 2 controlling drones, one – marking targets, uploading details to battlefield management system,
- Drones are used to hunt, kill equipment and individual soldiers,
- Drone operators work underground – from basements or improvised bunkers few meters underground – to survive light artillery fire,
- On the Ukrainian side – people fighting are 40+ yo, after ~1 month of training; original career military personnel is either dead/injured, serving as trainers or higher rank officers,
- Communication:
- Each team has own Starlink and is streaming view of the battlefield 24×7; camera image from drones is visible on android tables, screen is grabbed from those and broadcasted; most of the communication is done via Starlink,
- Very peer-to-peer communication structure – any other team can see view from the visual feeds from drones; targets are passed between the neighboring teams,
- Signal is heavily used for the communication; Discord was used for sharing of screens with view from drones, now it’s replaced by custom Ukrainian software,
- Android and Windows on any type of hardware is used by the teams,
- GPS is jammed on the ground level in the range of tens of kilometers around the front line, with enough shielding and antennas pointing to the sky – GPS few hundred meters about the ground and up; that’s how long distance drones and gliding bombs are guided,
- Unencrypted high frequency radio communication is used heavily by both sides,
- Both sides try to jam frequencies on which drones are controlled; wide range of frequencies are used but jamming is spotty [ requires a lot of energy, stationary jammers get taken out ]; in the past 6 months both sides started to use drones with fiber spools; they have 10-20km range and are usually single serving. Battlefield is full of spider-web of used optic cables. This increased distance between the front line and safe drop-off point where vehicles can deliver teams near the battlefield. Used to be hundreds of meters, now it’s ~5km.
- Logistics:
- Very decentralized way of purchase orders – each commander buys for their team – this includes hardware, drones, explosives,
- Cars delivering personnel near front lines have drone signal jammers; but that’s no longer sufficient with fiber-controlled drones,
- Done teams rotate twice a day – before dusk and after dawn; they hike ~5km, from there take car ride ~30km away from the front line. ~30-50km away from the front line there’s normal life – shopping malls open, factories operating etc,
- Drones are used to drop supplies for own military units, drop improvised explosive traps on the Russian side,
- Energy management is very important – each day drone unit arrives to the front line with couple 2-3 kWh power banks, ~40 already charged drone batteries; that’s 100-200 kg to bring forth and back per person,
- Work of drone unit:
- Monitor the same part of the land each day – they know it by heart, notice any changes which indicates presence of Russians; growing piles of garbage, stray dogs and cats are reliable indicators,
- Most work around the time of the rotation – early morning and evening; both sides hunt for people,
- Kamikaze attacks are accompanied by 2nd drone monitoring it; without it any attack it’s not a ‘confirmed kill’,
- It’s staggering how much off-the-shelf, non-military grade hardware is used; with a bit of duct tape, 3d printing and improvised explosives:
- Reconnaissance drones are prosumer-level DJI Mavic 3, Autel Evo II Pro – cost ~3-4k EUR each, last ~1 week,
- Cheap FPV / acro drones [ ~500 EUR each, few units destroyed per day per team] are used as kamikaze / loitering munition or as bomb droppers; DJIs are also used as bomb droppers with basic hardware mod – using drone’s optical signal which can be activated from the remote control, photo diode, small battery and servo mechanism,
- Signal boosters are used to extend the range and allow for 10-20m long cable between hand-held drone controller that’s usually kept underground and external antenna,
- Drone controllers are modified to allow for external antenna connections,
- Explosives are re-purposed grenades, mines, mortar shells or self-made by the drone teams. Tail fins, drone-droppers are 3d printed,
- While there’s a lot of innovation it’s really surprising that:
- There’s no separation of controller unit and radio transmitting unit – instead, controllers are connected via long cables carrying radio signals to external antennas and signal boosters; plenty of signal attenuation on cables & connectors; DJI has proprietary ecosystem, not interested in providing custom solutions to either of the sides of the conflict,
- Drones used at scale are not autonomous – e.g. no visual/thermal target tracking at the last 100m where signal jamming might prevent remote radio control,
- No drone stabilization based on camera image,
- Batteries for FPV drones that could allow for parallel charging to cut down number of batteries that need to be taken to the battle field each day,
- Corruption in Ukraine is clearly visible – e.g. bribes for avoiding military service, getting ability to leave country or when handling public procurement process,
- What we’ve done on the training:
- Basics about wind, weather, power management,
- Basic maintenance – propeller swap, battery swap,
- Flying reconnaissance drones, then flying them with disabled GPS navigation – where drone drifts with the wind, requires constant manual corrections,
- Dropping small payloads from 100m above to the target, basic heuristics to adjust targeting for the wind,
- Setting up antennas, cables,
- Digging small ‘bunker’, carrying equipment to it and starting flights at 4am,
- Using battlefield management software combined with observation from the drone – flying to nearby village, finding, without GPS, points of interest marked on the map, uploading photographs and spotted details, working in tandem with another team, taking turns in monitoring the same area, radio communication,
- Using reconnaissance drone to follow / record actions of FPV drone.